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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING. FEBRUARY 22, 1010

REF: 10 GENEVA 143 (SFO-GVA-VIII-065)
10 STATE 14963 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE-008)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-072.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 22, 2010

Time: 5:00 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. Siemon and General Poznikhir, the U.S. side provided comments to the Russian-proposed Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty--Telemetric Information, dated February 18, 2010 (Ref A). The U.S. side offered a general review of the proposal indicating where similarities and differences existed between the positions of the sides. The Russian side stated that it was surprised when a U.S. proposal on language for the Telemetry Protocol was delivered the previous Friday. The Russian side noted that it had provided conceptual work to move the process forward twice and the U.S.

proposal was dramatically different from the approach Russia presented. He also noted that the United States, during this round of negotiations, had provided nothing to the Russian side to move the telemetry issue forward. The U.S. side indicated it intended to merge the U.S.-proposed and Russian-proposed Protocols and deliver a U.S.-proposed merged document prior to the Russian delegation's departure for Moscow the following Saturday. (Begin comment: At the time of the meeting, the Russian delegation said they planned to leave Geneva after week four of the current session. End comment.) End summary.

¶4. (U) Subject Summary: General Review of Russian Proposal; Section I: General Provisions; Section II: Access to Telemetric Information; Section III: Guidance for the Exchange of Telemetric Exchange; Additional Issues; What was Needed for Signature; and Why Didn't the U.S. Proposal Consider Russia's Approach?

general review of russian proposal

¶5. (S) Siemon indicated the U.S. side had received guidance from Washington (Ref B) that directed A/S Gottemoeller to deliver the U.S. draft proposal on language for the Telemetry Protocol to the

Russian side. The proposal was delivered to the Russian side on February 19. The text follows.

Begin text:

Paper of the U.S. Side

19 February, 2010

Draft Proposal on Language for Telemetry Protocol

¶1. From the entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall exchange telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs.

¶2. The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by the sides, and in an agreed amount.

¶3. On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions and method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Additional details on the telemetry exchange are contained in the Annex on Telemetry Exchange Procedures.

End text.

¶6. (S) The U.S. proposal sought to fulfill the agreement that President Obama and President Medvedev had made during their January 27 telephone call to find a rapid way to come to closure to enable Treaty signature. The U.S. side believed that since Article X was close to agreement and since the U.S. Protocol proposal was based on agreed text from the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow, the proposal was a means to reach closure quickly on Treaty and

Protocol text. Siemon indicated that nothing the United States had provided or said was meant as a rejection of the Russian proposal. He noted that the U.S. side had two choices: work to provide a U.S.-proposed Annex or take the proposals of the two sides and draft a U.S.-proposed merged text. The U.S. side chose to draft a merged document that accurately indicated the similarities and differences in the text of the sides within brackets. Although the merged document was not yet drafted, Siemon conducted a general walk-through of the Russian-proposed protocol to indicate where the similarities and differences existed.

section I. General provisions

17. (S) Beginning in Section I, Siemon noted that paragraph 1 of the Russian text was the textual equivalent to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the U.S.-proposed Protocol. Therefore, he believed no changes were necessary. Sentence one of paragraph 5 captured the text of paragraph 3 of the U.S.-proposed Protocol. It was apparent that the Russian side had taken the text agreed to in the Mullen-Makarov meetings and incorporated it into its proposal. Paragraph 2 would be the first place where U.S.-bracketed text would appear since the U.S. side believed there needed to be a role for the receiving Party in the selection of the flight tests on which telemetric information would be exchanged. The U.S. side realized the ultimate decision belonged to the conducting Party and, therefore, the U.S. side would include bracketed text that identified the right of the conducting Party to reject a certain number of the requests from the receiving Party. Some of the U.S.-proposed text would carry over to paragraph 3 which referenced the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) in the process. Siemon noted that the U.S. text would focus on those flight tests in the upcoming year; however, the Russian idea that was reflected in the text which focused on flight tests of the previous year could be considered.

18. (S) Regarding paragraph 5 which included the Russian-proposed right of a Party to unilaterally suspend the telemetry exchange, Siemon believed the disagreement in the sides' positions could be resolved by changing sentence 2 to read as follows: "In the event that one Party raises a question concerning the need to change the quantity and amount of telemetric information transferred ((that cannot be resolved within the BCC,))1 the exchange of telemetric information shall be ((continued without change))1 ((suspended))2 until the Parties reach an agreement on the given change." Siemon stated he used this example to demonstrate the idea that only small text changes were necessary to create a merged document.

19. (S) Siemon stated that it was quite clear in the language of paragraph 6 that the Russian side envisioned exchanging telemetric information for 10 years, the life of the Treaty. He noted that the concept of this paragraph could be moved to either paragraph 2 or paragraph 3; however, it was important to clarify what happened at the end of the Treaty with respect to telemetry exchange in the final year.

Section II. Access TO Telemetric Information

10. (S) Siemon stated there were few substantive differences in

paragraphs 1, 2 or 3. The paragraphs encompassed the same basic concept as the U.S. approach, but that did not mean there would be no brackets.

Section III. Guidance for the
Exchange of Telemetric information

¶11. (S) Siemon stated that paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 contained text that differed dramatically from the U.S. position on the exchange of telemetric information and interpretative data for the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 would include brackets that changed references to a "Part" versus a "Protocol" and an "Annex" versus a "Section." Siemon concluded his review of the Protocol stating that there were both big differences in the sides' positions and also areas where the sides agreed.

Additional issues

¶12. (S) Siemon stated there were four additional issues to discuss during the next meeting. The first was an obligation for a Party to add additional information to the launch notification currently required by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, dated May 31, 1988. The second was additional discussion on replacing the term "flight test" with the term "launch." Siemon noted that a Russian proposal had been tabled in the Definitions Working Group on the issue; however, the treaty text needed to be reviewed to determine if the substitution could be made consistently throughout the entire treaty text. Siemon agreed with the Russian proposal in the last meeting that there were additional definitions required as a result of the proposed Protocol and Annex. Siemon believed the sides needed to determine if definitions from START were adequate or if new definitions needed to be drafted. Siemon believed the last item the sides needed to discuss was the additional notifications that were required to implement the Telemetry Protocol and Annex. He realized this was the work of the Notifications Working Group but a basic understanding of what was required needed to be discussed.

¶13. (S) Siemon stated the purpose of the brief overview was to give the Russian side insight into what the U.S. side believed was needed and to give the Russian side a preview of what to expect in the U.S. merged text. He noted some differences in positions were not technical, but political. He believed both capitals could provide guidance throughout the discussions but the discussions needed to continue in the Working Group. It was also important for the sides to accurately report discussions conducted in the Working Group so that capitals could respond with appropriate and productive guidance. Poznikhir had no questions.

What was needed for signature

¶14. (S) Poznikhir was interested in Siemon's opinion on what was required before Treaty signature. The Russian side had heard many times that the United States believed it was important for the Treaty, Protocol, and Annex to be prepared for signature. It was important to understand the U.S. position so that work could continue toward a common goal. Siemon believed both the Treaty and the Protocol should be prepared for signature. The Annex could be completed during the time period between signature and ratification as it had been in the START negotiations, but that the sides should work diligently to complete the Annex before signature.

Why didn't THE U.S. Proposal
Consider Russia's Approach?

¶15. (S) Poznikhir understood the U.S. side had guidance to implement, but he was surprised that the U.S proposal had not incorporated the Russian approach. Twice during this round the Russian side had provided proposals and discussed them in detail to move the work forward. Yet the U.S approach was dramatically different from the Russian approach. From this, the Russian side understood that the Russian text was unacceptable. The U.S proposal did not reflect the fundamental position of the Russian side that it was the right of the conducting Party to determine on which launches telemetric information would be exchanged. The Russian Protocol included provisions important to Russia, but none of these were reflected in the U.S proposal. Poznikhir did not understand why the U.S. side had not explained its approach to its Protocol language. Will the U.S side merge the Russian text into the new U.S. approach?

¶16. (S) Siemon noted that daily dialogue between A/S Gottemoeller and Amb Antonov focused on a desire to complete the Treaty text and Protocol quickly on the basis of previously agreed language so that progress could be made toward signature. The text of the U.S. proposal was simple, direct, and based on previously agreed Protocol text.

¶17. (S) He noted that Gottemoeller had tried to pass text to Antonov and to explain the U.S. position, but Antonov had refused to accept the text or engage in a discussion. Siemon stated that he intended to work from the Russian proposal and draft a U.S. merged text that he would provide to the Russian side prior to its departure for Moscow. He intended the U.S. text to be a reflection of the positions of the sides and for the Russian side to study the

text while in Moscow.

¶18. (S) Poznikhir commented that the Russian side would not consider an additional telemetry meeting until it had an opportunity to fully review the merged text in written form. He also stated the Russian delegation would return to Moscow later in the week and take any U.S. text for review between sessions. He stated he intended to report that during this round of negotiations the United States had provided nothing to the Russian side to move the telemetry issue forward.

¶19. (U) Documents provided: None.

¶20. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Dean

Lt Col Goodman

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Smith (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznikhir

Ms. Fuzhenkova

Col Kamenskiy

Col Ryzhkov

Mr. Voloskov

Col Zaitsev

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING